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The Paradigmatic Body
Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language
Vittorio Gallese & Valentina Cuccio
In this paper we propose a way in which cognitive neuroscience could provide
new insights on three aspects of social cognition: intersubjectivity, the human self,
and language. We emphasize the crucial role of the body, conceived as the con-
stitutive source of pre-reflective consciousness of the self and of the other. We
provide a critical view of contemporary social cognitive neuroscience, arguing that
the brain level of description is a necessary but not sufficient condition for study-
ing intersubjectivity, the human self, and language; which are only properly vis-
ible if coupled with a full appreciation of their intertwined relationship with the
body. We introduce mirror mechanisms and embodied simulation and discuss their
relevance to a new account of intersubjectivity and the human self. In this context,
we focus on a specifically human modality of intersubjectivity: language. Aspects
of social cognition related to language are discussed in terms of embodiment,
while emphasizing the progress and limitations of this approach. We argue that a
key aspect of human language consists in its decoupling from its usual denotative
role, hence manifesting its power of abstraction. We discuss these features of hu-
man language as instantiations of the Greek notion of paradeigma, originally ex-
plored by Aristotle to refer to a typical form of rhetorical reasoning and relate it
to embodied simulation. Paradigmatic knowledge connects the particular with the
particular, moving from the contingent particular situation to an exemplary case.
Similarly, embodied simulation is the suspension of the “concrete” application of a
process: reuse of motor knowledge in the absence of the movement it realizes is
an example of “paradigmatic knowledge.” This new epistemological approach to
intersubjectivity generates predictions about the intrinsic functional nature of our
social cognitive operations, cutting across, and not subordinated to, a specific on-
tology of mind. 
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1 Introduction
The last decades of the twentieth century were
marked by great progress in cognitive neuros-
cience,  made  possible  by  recently-developed
brain  imaging  technologies  such  as  functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)—which al-
lowed for  the first  time non-invasive  study of
the human brain.
But  what  is  cognitive  neuroscience?  We
think it is fair to say that it is above all a meth-
odological approach whose results are strongly
influenced by which questions are being asked
and how.  Studying  single  neurons  and/or  the
brain  does  not  necessarily  predetermine  the
questions to be asked that will help us under-
stand how and how much our human nature de-
pends  upon our  brains.  Even  less  so  the  an-
swers. Our purpose here is twofold. On the one
hand, we aim to provide a brief overview of cur-
rent cognitive neuroscience and its methods. We
first present the limitations displayed by most
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current mainstream cognitive neuroscience, fol-
lowed by a proposal for an alternative approach,
both in terms of the employed methodology and
of  its  main  goals.  In  short,  in  contrast  with
what many normally take for granted1, we as-
sume the brain level of description to be a ne-
cessary but not sufficient condition for studying
intersubjectivity, language, and the human self,
which are only properly visible if coupled with a
full  appreciation  of  their  intertwined  relation-
ship with the body. This overview has been spe-
cifically designed to provide a useful tool for re-
searchers working in the humanities. Section  2
is entirely devoted to this goal. 
On the other hand, the authors of this es-
say are a cognitive neuroscientist and a philo-
sopher of language, and as such our second pur-
pose is  to propose how cognitive neuroscience
could provide new insights on specific aspects of
human cognition. In section 3 we introduce mir-
ror mechanisms and embodied simulation and,
in the following sections, we discuss their relev-
ance for a new account of intersubjectivity, the
human self, and language—which privileges the
body as the transcendental foundation of each.
We emphasize the crucial role of the body,
conceived as the constitutive source of pre-re-
flective  consciousness  of  the  self  and  of  the
other and as the ground upon which linguistic
meaning is also based. The body we talk about
in this paper manifests itself  in two different,
complementary,  and closely  intertwined ways:2
it  is  a  Leib,  a lived body entertaining experi-
ences of self and others, and a  Körper, the so-
matic  object,  of  which  the  brain  is  a  con-
1 “Still other accounts of grounded cognition focus on situated action,
social interaction, and the environment (e.g., Barsalou 2003, Bars-
alou  et  al.  2007a,  Glenberg  1997,  W.  Prinz  1997,  Rizzolatti  &
Craighero 2004, Robbins & Aydede 2007, E. Smith & Semin 2004,
Yeh & Barsalou 2006). From this perspective, the cognitive system
evolved to support action in specific situations, including social inter-
action. These accounts stress interactions between perception, action,
the body, the environment, and other agents, typically during goal
achievement. It is important to note that the phrase ‘embodied cog-
nition’ is often used when referring to this collection of literatures.
Problematically,  however,  ‘embodied  cognition’  produces  the  mis-
taken assumption that all researchers in this community believe that
bodily states are necessary for cognition and that these researchers
focus  exclusively  on  bodily  states  in  their  investigations.  Clearly,
however,  cognition often proceeds  independently of the body, and
many researchers address other forms of grounding.” (Barsalou 2008,
p. 619)
2 We find it useful to employ here the distinction originally proposed
by Edmund Husserl in Husserl (1973, p. 119).
stitutive part. We posit that this dual nature of
our experienced body can be fully understood—
and  its  genesis  revealed—by  investigating  its
motor neurophysiological underpinnings at the
sub-personal level. The naturalization of inter-
subjectivity,  the  self,  and  language  implies  a
first attempt to isolate the constituent compon-
ents of the concepts we use to refer to these as-
pects of human social cognition by literally in-
vestigating what they are made of at the level
of description of the brain–body system. This
attempt in relation to the notions of intersub-
jectivity, the self, and language is intended here
to  form an identification  of  their  constitutive
mechanisms. We believe that this investigation
becomes really effective only when it is framed
within  both  comparative  and  developmental
perspectives.3
The comparative perspective not only al-
lows us to frame human social cognition within
an evolutionary picture,  thus providing access
to its phylogenetic antecedents.4 It also greatly
reduces the risk of the empirical investigation of
the human brain being subordinated to a spe-
cific human ontology of mind. A further reason
for  privileging  the  comparative  perspective
resides  in  the  fact  that  it  also  brings  us  the
most finely grained approach to date for study-
ing the brain, and the possibility of correlating
single neurons’ activity with behaviour and cog-
nition—as when studying single neurons’ activ-
ity in non-human primates, like macaque mon-
keys.
The  immanent  transcendence5 of  the
body’s corporeality can be revealed, we contend,
by bringing the analysis back to the level of the
brain–body system; that is, to the level of the
Körper. We show that this particular neurocog-
3 One of the major contributions to our understanding of human social
cognition is provided by developmental psychology. In this paper, for
sake of concision we don’t focus on developmental aspects, in spite of
the crucial importance we attribute to them to thoroughly address
the issues we want to address here. 
4 It is interesting to note that this comparative perspective seems to
support the hypothesis of an evolutionary continuity between human
and non-human primates in relation to the emergence of language
from our sensori-motor abilities. For a discussion of this topic, see
Glenberg & Gallese (2012). 
5 The expression immanent transcendence is meant to signify here
the fact that the body, by means of a biological mechanism (im-
manent), can transcend his usual function (for example, motion)
to  become  expression  (a  model  or  paradeigma)  of  this  bodily
knowledge.
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nitive approach is beginning to reveal the tight
relationship between a core notion of the bodily
self, its potentiality for action, and motor simu-
lation at the level of the cortical motor system.
Cognitive neuroscience can enable the analysis
of  several  concepts  and  notions  we  normally
refer to when describing ourselves and our social
cognitive lives. In the present paper we apply
this method to the notions of intersubjectivity,
the self, and language. 
To fully account for the specific quality of
human social  cognition one cannot undervalue
the linguistic dimension. For this reason, we in-
troduce  aspects  of  social  cognition  related  to
language and discuss them in terms of embodi-
ment, emphasizing the progress and limitations
of  this  approach.  Traditionally,  the  linguistic
and corporeal sensorimotor dimensions of social
cognition  have  been  considered  entirely  unre-
lated. We posit that embodied simulation, con-
ceived of as a model for important aspects of
our relation to the world, might help in over-
coming  this  apparently  unsolvable  dichotomy.
We argue that a key aspect defining the unique
specificity of human language consists in its de-
coupling  from  its  usual  denotative  role.  This
means  that  language  allows  us  to  talk  about
general  concepts  such  as  beauty  or  mankind,
without  denoting  any  particular  instance  of
these  concepts.  In  so  doing,  human  language
manifests its power for abstraction. We discuss
these  features  of  human language  as  instanti-
ations of the Greek notion of  paradeigma, ori-
ginally explored by Aristotle,  and relate it  to
embodied simulation. When a word or syntagm,
like the Latin word Rosa, is decoupled from its
usual denotative role, it can function as a gen-
eral rule of knowledge, e.g., as a paradigm for
the female nominative case of Latin nouns be-
longing  to  the first  declension.  The notion  of
paradeigma does  not  establish  a  connection
between a universal principle and its contingent
aspects, as in deduction, it rather exemplifies a
particular  case  of  induction:  specifically  the
transposition  of  inductive  reasoning  in  in  the
field  of  studies  of  persuasive  communication,
known as rethorics, where contingent particular
cases  lead  to  general  rules  describing  them.
Paradigmatic  knowledge,  however,  differently
from standard cases of induction, connects the
particular with the particular, moving from the
contingent particular situation to an exemplary
case.  We  propose  that  embodied  simulation
could instantiate such a notion of paradigmatic
knowledge,  hence  enabling  its  naturalization
and  helping  us  overcome  the  apparent  gap
between the linguistic and corporeal dimensions.
We conclude by emphasizing how the spe-
cific use of cognitive neuroscience here proposed
can lead to a new take on social cognition. This
new take brings about a demonstration on em-
pirical grounds of the constitutive role played in
foundational aspects of social cognition by the
human body, when conceived of in terms of its
motor  potentialities;  hence  its  transcendental
quality.6 Of course this only covers a partial as-
pect of social cognition. However, we think this
approach has the merit of providing an epistem-
ological model, which is also potentially useful
for empirical investigation into the more cognit-
ively sophisticated aspects of human social cog-
nition. 
2 The cognitive neuroscience of what?
It is a fact and an undisputable truth that there
cannot  be  any mental  life  without  the  brain.
More controversial  is  whether the level  of  de-
scription offered by the brain is also sufficient
for providing a thorough and biologically-plaus-
ible  account  of  social  cognition.  We  think  it
isn’t. We would like to ground this assertion on
two arguments:  the first  deals  with the  often
overlooked intrinsic limitations of the approach
adopting the brain level of description, particu-
larly when the brain is considered in isolation
and its intimate relation with the body is neg-
lected;  the  second  deals  with  social  cognitive
neuroscience’s current prevalent explanatory ob-
jectives and contents.
The contemporary emphasis divulgated by
the popular media, namely the supposedly re-
volutionary heuristic value of cognitive neuros-
cience,  mostly rests  upon the results of  brain
imaging techniques, and in particular on fMRI.
6 The “transcendental quality” attributed to the body is intended to
mean that the body is considered as the a priori, non-further redu-
cible condition of the possibility of experience.
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fMRI is often presented as the ultimate method
of investigation of the human mind. It should
be pointed out, though, that fMRI studies do
not constitute the whole story in cognitive neur-
oscience.  Cognitive  neuroscience  can  indeed
carry  out  its  investigation  at  a  more  drastic
sub-personal level, such as at the level of single
neurons (see below), both in macaque monkeys
and,  although much more  rarely,  even  in  hu-
mans.  These  alternative  approaches  notwith-
standing, the main thrust of cognitive neuros-
cience in studying human brain function is, as
we speak, mostly confined to fMRI.7
Unfortunately fMRI only indirectly “sees”
the workings of the brain, by measuring neur-
ons’  oxygen  consumption.  Such  a  measure  is
also indirect, as it depends on the local differ-
ence  between  oxygenated  and  deoxygenated
hemoglobin—the iron-rich  molecule  housed  by
red  blood  cells,  which  carriess  oxygen  to  all
bodily  organs  and  tissues.  Oxygenated  and
deoxygenated  hemoglobin  have  different  para-
magnetic  behaviours in  relation to the strong
magnetic field that is created by a big coil, in-
side which the head is placed. The measure of
this functional parameter allows scientists to es-
timate local neural activity in terms of different
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) signals. The
indirect  quality  of  this  kind  of  estimation  of
brain activity, which is based on local hemody-
namic  brain  responses,  inevitably  introduces
distortions  and  noise.  Indeed,  when  studying
any sensorimotor, perceptual, or cognitive func-
tion, in order to maximize the so-called “signal-
to-noise ratio”, several repetitions of the same
task in many individuals are required.
This means that fMRI allows us to indir-
ectly  assess  the  average  brain-activation  level
induced by any given task across a population
of no less than twelve to fifteen different indi-
viduals.  Within  each  studied  individual  brain
the spatial resolution of fMRI is within the or-
der of few millimetres. This implies that we are
able to measure at best the potentially coherent
activation pattern of several hundred thousand
neighbouring  neurons,  possibly  also  differing
7 For an intriguing discussion of the historical antecedents of brain imaging
techniques and a passionate criticism of the limitations of current use of
brain imaging by cognitive neuroscience, see Legrenzi & Umiltà (2011).
among one another in terms of their excitatory
or inhibitory role.
Temporal resolution is even worse, since it
is  in  the order  of  a  few seconds.  One should
consider that action potentials,  or “spikes” as
neurophysiologists like to call them—the electric
code  employed  by  neurons  to  “communicate”
with each other, and ultimately the true essence
of  neurons’  activity—last  less  than  one  milli-
second. fMRI cannot match such temporal res-
olution  because  it  measures  the  delayed  (of
about  two seconds)  and prolonged (for  about
five  seconds)  local  hemodynamic  response
providing  neurons  with  all  the  oxygen  their
electric activity requires.
As we have previously argued, fMRI is not
the only available experimental methodology for
studying  the  brain.  Many different  techniques
are  available  nowadays  (e.g.,  PET  (positron
emission  tomography),  NIRS  (near-infrared
spectroscopy), Tdcs (transcranial direct-current
stimulation)  or  TMS  (transcranial  magnetic
stimulation)). Particularly, since the revolution-
ary  introduction  in  1927  by  the  Nobel  Prize
laureate  Edgar  Adrian  (Adrian &  Matthews
1927a,  1927b)  of  the  extracellular  microelec-
trode, which allows the recording of action po-
tentials  discharged  by  single  neurons,  neuro-
physiology has made enormous progress in re-
vealing  the  brain’s  physiological  mechanisms.
Such  neurophysiological  investigation  started
with  the  study  of  the  neural  circuits  that
preside  over  elementary  sensorimotor  beha-
viours, like spinal reflexes, finally moving all the
way up to the investigation of action and per-
ception, reward and emotions, spatial mapping
and navigation, working memory, decision-mak-
ing,  etc.,  in  behaving  animals  like  macaque
monkeys.  Unfortunately,  such a finely  grained
level  of  description—both  in  terms  of  spatial
and  temporal  resolution,  is  most  of  the  time
precluded in humans.
We posit that the scientific study of inter-
subjectivity and the human self requires a com-
parative approach, and that this is the only one
capable  of  connecting the  distinctive  traits  of
human nature to their likely phylogenetic pre-
cursors. In so doing, and by making use of the
single-neuron  recording  approach,  neuro-
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physiological  mechanisms  and  the  cortico-cor-
tical networks expressing them can be related
with several aspects of primates’ social cognitive
behaviour and thus be thoroughly investigated.
Conceptual  notions  like  intersubjectivity  and
the self  should be analyzed in order to better
understand their nature, structure, and proper-
ties. Such an analysis, which provides us a de-
flationary notion of the same concepts, intended
as the identification of their minimal component
and the detailed study of their origin, will be
most successful if driven by a meticulous invest-
igation of  the underpinning neurophysiological
mechanisms—which most of the time are avail-
able only from the study of non human prim-
ates’ brains, hence the necessity of a comparat-
ive perspective.
Human brain imaging, because of the in-
trinsic limitations we briefly outlined above, can
only  provide  correlations  between  particular
brain patterns of activation and particular be-
haviours or mental states. This implies that the
correlation between a particular brain state and
a particular phenomenal mental state of a given
individual  human  being8 is  most  informative
when the specificity and uniqueness of such a
correlation can be firmly established. Unfortu-
nately, this is  not always the case with fMRI
studies. Very telling is the supposed mindread-
ing specificity of some cortical circuits compris-
ing the ventral portion of the mesial frontal cor-
tex  and  the  TPJ  (temporo-parietal  junction;
e.g., Leslie 2005; Saxe 2006). Such specificity is
not only so far unproven, but is actually con-
futed by accumulated evidence (for a lengthier
discussion of this point and for arguments and
experimental  evidence  against  such  specificity
see Ammaniti & Gallese 2014; Gallese 2014).
In  spite  of  all  these  limitations,  this
neuroimaging approach turned out to be very
productive,  enabling  us to  study for  the first
time in parallel brains, behaviour and cognition,
shedding  new light  not  only  on  human brain
structure, but also on its wiring pattern of con-
8 For sake of concision and focus we do not discuss here the implicated
topic  of  the apparently  absent synchronicity between brain states
and  phenomenal  consciousness  (remember  that  fMRI  does  not
provide a good temporal resolution to firmly match brain states and
phenomenal consciousness). We simply want to stress the parallel ex-
istence of particular experiences and particular brain states. 
nectivity and many of its functions. If we put
the newly-acquired knowledge on brain function
provided by cognitive neuroscience under scru-
tiny, we can make very interesting discoveries.
For example, we discovered that in many areas
of  investigation  brain  imaging  replicates  and
validates at a different scale what had been pre-
viously discovered at the single neuron level in
animals like macaques.9
The prominent discoveries, among others,
of David Hubel, Torsten Wiesel, and Semir Zeki
on the functional organization of primates’ cor-
tical visual system, like the orientation-, shape-,
motion- and colour-selectivity of visual neurons,
were made by correlating the discharge activity
of  single  neurons  in  macaques’  visual  cortices
with different parameters of the visual stimuli
macaques were looking at (for a comprehensive
review of this literature, see  Zeki 1993). These
results  later  promoted  a  similar  investigation
carried out  on the human brain by means of
fMRI. Remarkably enough, a similar functional
architecture was detected in the human visual
brain,  in  spite  of  the  species  difference  and,
most importantly, the different scale at which
these investigations were carried out: a few hun-
dreds recorded neurons at best, in the case of
macaques’ brains, versus hundreds of thousands
if not millions of activated neurons detected by
a local increase in blood flow in the case of the
human brain.
Face-selective  neurons,  first  described  in
the  early  nineteen-seventies  by  Charles  Gross
and  colleagues  in  macaques’  temporal  cortex
(Gross et al. 1972), and immediately ridiculed
as  “grand-mother  cells”,  offer  another  very
telling  example.10 Face-selective  brain  circuits
appear to be strikingly similar in macaques and
humans (see Ku et al. 2011). Furthermore, even
in human brains single neurons were detected
that selectively respond to a single face—such
9 The comparative approach is primarily intended here as a compar-
ison between humans and other animals. As a consequence, it also
implies a comparison between different experimental methods.
10 The notion of the grandmother cell was originally introduced by the
neuroscientist Jerry Lettvin to refer to neurons with high integrative
power,  which are able to map concepts  or objects. The term has
since  then mostly been employed with a negative  connotation by
supporters of a more distributed population-coding of objects, per-
cepts, and memories. For an historical account of the notion of the
grandmother cell, see Gross (2002).
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as  the  so-called  Jennifer  Aniston’s  selective
neurons (see  Quiroga et al. 2005). These neur-
ons  respond  to  multiple  representations  of  a
particular individual, regardless of the specific
visual features of the picture used. Indeed, these
neurons respond similarly to different pictures
of the same person and even to his or her writ-
ten or spoken name. The authors of this study
claimed that their evidence supported the no-
tion that single neurons within the human me-
dial  temporal  lobe  cortex  instantiate  the  ab-
stract representation of the identity of a single
individual.
Such  examples  seem  to  suggest  that  in
spite  of  the  big  scale  magnification  implied
when  confronting  single-neuron  data  from
macaques and fMRI results from humans, some
important  functional  features  are  nevertheless
manifest across these different levels of descrip-
tion (i.e., single neurons vs. brain areas). One
can study canonical or mirror neurons (see be-
low) by recording the activity of a few hundred
spiking neurons from a behaving macaque mon-
key  during  object  and  action  observation,  re-
spectively. The same results can be replicated
by detecting, by means of fMRI, and during ob-
ject  and  action  observation,  the  simultaneous
activation of hundreds of thousands of human
neurons within analogous cortical areas of the
human brain.
This  remarkable  but  often  neglected  fact
cannot be the result of a pure coincidence. This
evidence should thus invite us to resist and argue
against those who downplay the heuristic power
of single-neuron recording. Their thesis is that be-
cause  of  a  supposedly  incommensurable  gap
between single neurons and the incredible com-
plexity of  the  human brain,  where  information
would be exclusively mapped at the level of large
populations of poorly selective neurons, it doesn’t
make any sense to study the brain by recording
single neurons. The fact however is that in spite
of  the  almost  astronomic  figures  characterizing
the human brain (about 100 billion neurons, each
of which connects with thousands of other neur-
ons), its complexity does not parallel such astro-
nomic figures, or at least not in such a way as to
deny any heuristic value to the single-neuron re-
cording approach. Let’s see why.
As  argued  by  Chittka &  Niven (2009),
brain size may have less of a relationship with
behavioural  repertoire  and  cognitive  capacity
than generally assumed. According to the same
authors,  larger  brains are,  in  part  at  least,  a
consequence  of  larger  neurons that  are  neces-
sary in large animals due to basic biophysical
constraints.  Larger brains also contain greater
replication of neuronal circuits, adding precision
to sensory processes, detail to perception, more
parallel  processing,  enlarged  storage  capacity,
and greater plasticity. These advantages, main-
tain  Chittka &  Niven (2009),  are  unlikely  to
produce the qualitative shifts in behaviour that
are often assumed to accompany increased brain
size, or at least not in a one-to-one manner.
The evidence so far briefly reviewed and
that we will present in the next sections suggest
that some functional properties of the brain ex-
hibit a sort of “fractal quality”, such that they
can be appreciated at different scales and levels
of investigation. For these reasons fMRI cannot
be the sole neurocognitive approach to human
social cognition,11 but it must be complemented
by other approaches compensating for some of
its deficiencies: like TMS, EEG (electroenceph-
alography),  and  the  comparative  functional
study of non-human primates by means of brain
imaging and single-neuron recordings.
After having clarified what we take to be
the  often-neglected  limitations  of  cognitive
neuroscience that may hinder its potential heur-
istic power (namely, that fMRI offers only an
indirect estimation of brain activity, inferred by
measuring  neurons’  oxygen  consumption,  and
this  inevitably  leads  to  distortions  and noise,
and that it does not provide good temporal res-
olution  because  it  measures  the  delayed  and
prolonged hemodynamic responses due to neur-
ons  oxygenation),  let  us  now  move  to  the
second argument against  the  sufficiency satis-
faction condition of the current approach of cog-
nitive neuroscience to the study of human social
cognition. This argument concerns the explanat-
ory goals and contents of contemporary main-
11 Maybe no one explicitly claims this. However, it is very common that
researchers neglect many (or all) of the complementary techniques
that have been here suggested to be necessary and draw inferences
about human social cognition and its neural implementation. As an
example, see papers by Ian Apperly.
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stream  cognitive  neuroscience.  Vast  quarters
within  cognitive  neuroscience  are  still  today
strongly influenced by classical cognitivism, on
one side, and by evolutionary psychology on the
other. Classical cognitive science is the bearer of
a  solipsistic  vision  of  the  mind,  according  to
which focusing on the mind of the single indi-
vidual is all that is required in order to define
what a mind is and how it works. The image of
the mind that classical cognitive science gives us
is that of a functional system whose processes
are described in terms of manipulations of in-
formational symbols in accordance with a series
of formal syntactic rules.
According to evolutionary psychology, by
contrast, the human mind is a set of cognitive
modules, each of which has been selected during
evolution for its adaptive value. Major figures of
this current, such as John Tooby and Leda Cos-
mides, have gone as far as maintaining that the
brain  is  a  physical  system that  works  like  a
computer (Cosmides & Tooby 1997). According
to Steven Pinker (1994, 1997), our cognitive life
can be referred to in terms of the function of a
series of modules like the linguistic module, the
module for the Theory of the Mind, etc.
Based  on  this  theoretical  framework,  in
the  last  twenty  years  cognitive  neuroscience
when investigating human social cognition has
mainly tried to locate—as mentioned above—
the cognitive modules in the human brain. Such
an approach suffers from ontological reduction-
ism, because it reifies human subjectivity and
intersubjectivity within a mass of neurons vari-
ously distributed in the brain. This ontological
reductionism chooses  as  a  level  of  description
the activation of segregated cerebral areas or, at
best, the activation of circuits that connect dif-
ferent areas and regions of the brain. However,
if brain imaging is not backed up by a detailed
phenomenological  analysis  of  the  perceptual,
motor, and cognitive processes that it aims to
study and—even more importantly—if the res-
ults are not interpreted, as previously argued,
on  the  basis  of  the  study  of  the  activity  of
single neurons in animal models, and the study
of clinical patients, then cognitive neuroscience,
when  exclusively  consisting  in  brain  imaging,
loses much of its heuristic power. Without the
demonstration  of  the  specific  correlation
between brain states and mind states and the
explanation  of  such  correlation,  much  of  the
contemporary brain imaging approach to social
cognition looks like a sort of high-tech version
of phrenology.
For  this  reason  a  “phenomenologization”
of cognitive neuroscience is desirable, as Gallese
has  proposed  before  (see  Gallese 2007,  2009,
2011,  2014). In Gallese’s view, to “phenomeno-
logize”  cognitive  neuroscience  means  to  start
neuroscientific  research  from  the  analysis  of
subjective experience and of the role that the
living body plays in the constitution of our ex-
perience of material objects and of other living
individuals. In this way, the empirical study of
the genetic aspects of subjectivity and intersub-
jectivity can be pursued on new bases—if com-
pared to those thus far adopted by classical cog-
nitivism. Francisco Varela a few years ago real-
ized a similar possibility and set out on a path-
way  of  analysis  in  this  direction  (Varela &
Shear 1999).
Times  change,  however.  We are insisting
on nothing less than a change of paradigm. A
new neuroscientific approach to the study of the
human mind is gaining momentum. It capital-
izes upon the study of the bodily dimension of
knowledge:  the so-called “embodied cognition”
approach. In the next section we introduce mir-
ror neurons and embodied simulation. Our pur-
pose is to show that, starting from a sub-per-
sonal  neuroscientific  description  of  the  prag-
matic  relationship  with  the  world,  a  pathway
can be traced to define the forms of subjectivity
and  intersubjectivity  that  distinguish  human
nature, rooted in the bodily interacting nature
of human beings.
3 Mirroring mechanisms and embodied 
simulation
The discovery in the early 1990s of mirror neur-
ons  in  the  brain  of  macaques  (Gallese et  al.
1996; Rizzolatti et al. 1996), and the subsequent
discovery of  mirror mechanisms in the human
brain (see Gallese et al. 2004; Rizzolatti & Sini-
gaglia 2010) suggest that there exists a direct
modality  of  access  to  the  meaning  of  other
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people’s behaviours—a modality that can be set
aside from the explicit  attribution of  proposi-
tional attitudes. Mirror neurons are motor neur-
ons, originally discovered in macaques’ ventral
premotor cortex area F5, later on also found in
the  reciprocally-connected  posterior  parietal
areas AIP and PFG. Mirror neurons not only
respond to the execution of movements and ac-
tions, but also respond to the perception of ac-
tions executed by others. Mirror neurons map
the  action  of  others  on  the  observers’  motor
representation of  the same action. Further re-
search  also  demonstrated  in  the  human brain
the existence of a mechanism directly mapping
action perception and execution, defined as the
Mirror  Mechanism (MM; for  a  recent  review,
see Ammaniti & Gallese 2014; Gallese 2014). In
addition,  in  humans  the  motor  brain  is  mul-
timodal. Thus, it doesn’t matter whether we see
or  hear  the  noise  made  by  someone  cracking
peanuts,  or  locking  a  door.  Different—visual
and  auditory—sensory  accounts  of  the  same
motor behaviour activate the very motor neur-
ons that normally enable it. The brain circuits
showing evidence of the MM, connecting frontal
and posterior parietal multimodal motor neur-
ons, most likely analogous to macaques’ mirror
neurons, map a given motor content like “reach
out” or “grasp” not only during their perform-
ance, but also when perceiving the same motor
behaviour performed by someone else, when im-
itating  it,  or  when  imagining  performing  it
while  remaining  perfectly  still.  The  relational
character of behaviour as mapped by the cor-
tical motor system enables the appreciation of
purpose  without  relying  on  explicit  proposi-
tional inference.
Altogether, these findings led to the for-
mulation of the “Motor Cognition” hypothesis
as a crucial element in the emergence of social
cognition (Gallese 2009). According to this hy-
pothesis, cognitive abilities like the hierarchical
representation of action with respect to a distal
goal, the detection of motor goals in others’ be-
haviour, and action anticipation are possible be-
cause of the peculiar functional architecture of
the motor system, organized in terms of goal-
directed motor acts. Traditionally, the relation
between actions and their outcomes is assumed
to  be  largely  independent  of  the  motor  pro-
cesses and representations underpinning action
execution.  Such  processes  and  representations
allegedly  concern  elementary  motor  features
such as joint displacements or muscle contrac-
tions  only.  However,  solid  empirical  evidence
challenged this view. Motor processes may in-
volve motor representations of action goals (e.g.,
to grasp, to place, etc.), and not only kinematic
or  dynamic  components  of  actions.  This  sug-
gests  that  beliefs,  desires,  and  intentions  are
neither primitive nor the only bearers of inten-
tionality in action. We do not necessarily need
to metarepresent in propositional format the in-
tentions of  others  to understand them. Motor
outcomes and motor intentions are part of the
“vocabulary” that is spoken by the motor sys-
tem. On occasion we do not explicitly ascribe
intentions to others; we simply detect them. In-
deed,  we  posit  that  motor  representation  is
enough to ground the directedness of an action
to its outcome (Gallese 2000,  2003b;  Butterfill
&  Sinigaglia 2014;  compare  also  Gallagher’s
2005 notion of direct perception).
One of the consequences of the discovery
of mirror neurons was the possibility of deriving
subjectivity  from intersubjectivity  at  the sub-
personal level of description. The sense of self is
precociously  developed,  beginning  from a  self
that  is  first  of  all  physical  and  bodily,  and
which is constituted precisely by the possibility
of interacting and acting with the other.  Em-
bodied simulation can provide the neurobiolo-
gical basis for early forms of intersubjectivity,
from which the sense of the self  is built. The
discovery of mirror neurons and the simulation
mechanism  would  therefore  seem  to  further
stress that being a self also implies being with
the other.  The model of intersubjectivity sug-
gested  by  mirror  mechanisms  and  embodied
simulation correlatively sheds new light on the
subjective  dimension  of  existence.  Let  us  see
first what type of intersubjectivity mirror neur-
ons seem to suggest.
The discovery of mirror neurons gives us a
new  empirically-grounded  notion  of  intersub-
jectivity connoted first and foremost as intercor-
poreality—the mutual resonance of intentionally
meaningful sensorimotor behaviours. The ability
Gallese, V. & Cuccio, V. (2015). The Paradigmatic Body - Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 14(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570269 8 | 22
www.open-mind.net
to understand others as intentional agents does
not exclusively depend on propositional compet-
ence,  but  it  is  highly  dependent  on  the  rela-
tional nature of action. According to this hypo-
thesis, it is possible to directly understand the
meaning of other people’s basic actions thanks
to a motor equivalence between what others do
and what the observer can do. Intercorporeality
thus  becomes  the  main  source  of  knowledge
that we have of others. The motor simulation
instantiated by neurons endowed with “mirror
properties” is probably the neural correlate of
this  human  faculty,  describable  in  functional
terms such as “embodied simulation” (Gallese
2003a, 2005, 2011; Gallese & Sinigaglia 2011b).
Action constitutes only one dimension of
the rich baggage of experiences involved in in-
terpersonal  relations.  Every interpersonal  rela-
tion  implies  the  sharing  of  a  multiplicity  of
states like, for instance, the experience of emo-
tions and sensations. Today we know that the
very nervous structures involved in the subject-
ive  experience of  emotions and sensations are
also active when such emotions and sensations
are recognized in others. A multiplicity of “mir-
roring” mechanisms is present in our brain. It
was proposed that these mechanisms, thanks to
the  “intentional  attunement”  they  generate
(Gallese 2006), allow us to recognize others as
our fellows, likely making intersubjective com-
munication and mutual implicit understanding
possible. The functional architecture of embod-
ied simulation seems to constitute a basic char-
acteristic of our brain, making possible our rich
and diversified intersubjective experiences, and
lying at the basis of our capacity to empathize
with others. 
4 Body and self
After having delineated a deflationary neurobio-
logically-grounded  account  of  basic  aspects  of
intersubjectivity, namely an account focused on
the minimal core mechanisms of intersubjectiv-
ity, let us now address the relationship between
body and self. A minimal manifestation of the
sense  of  self  can  already  be  identified  in  our
first bodily experiences, and this highlights the
potential contribution of bodily experiences to
its  constitution.  Some aspects  of  the minimal
self  proposed  by  contemporary  philosophical
and empirical research are the notion of first-
person perspective, the “mineness” of the phe-
nomenal  field  (Meinigkeit),  embodiment  of
point of view, and issues of agency and body
ownership  (Cermolacce et  al. 2007).12 On  the
philosophical  side,  phenomenology  emphasizes
the necessity of embodiment of the self for all
the above-cited aspects of self experience. As ar-
gued by  Cermolacce et al. (2007, p. 704, foot-
note 3), in phenomenology 
the field of experience is not yet considered
to  be  subjective  because  this  predicate
already implies that there is a subject. For
phenomenology, the very idea of the subject
articulates itself in experience. In this sense,
the manifestation and appearing of experi-
ence are the conditions for the experience of
the subject in question.
This philosophical standpoint has important im-
plications for the empirical investigation of the
neural correlates of the self.13 Rather than em-
pirically addressing the self by starting with a
search for the neural correlates of a pre-defined,
explicit, and reflective self-consciousness, we be-
lieve  it  to  be  more  productive  to  investigate
what what set of constitutive conditions allows
an  implicit  and  pre-reflective  sense  of  self  to
emerge, and how this is effected. The interesting
questions to be first answered are: “What en-
ables the basic experience of ourselves as bodily
selves?  What  enables  us  to  implicitly  distin-
guish ourselves, as bodily selves, from other hu-
man bodily selves?” In the following we review
and discuss recent empirical evidence providing
preliminary answers to these questions.
12 Again, for sake of concision, we do not deal here with the relation-
ship between the notion of a core, minimal self as a bodily self and
agency and body ownership. On this topic, see Gallese & Sinigaglia
(2010, 2011a). Moreover, it is worth noting that the arguments pro-
posed in this section in relation to the notion of a minimal bodily
self could be applied to other non-human animals. The possibility
that high-level self-awareness can emerge from a primitive and non-
conceptual  form of self-awareness,  and that it  is  possible that we
share this basic level of the sense of self with other non-human anim-
als, has already been discussed. For a discussion of this and other re-
lated topics see Bermúdez (2003).
13 See Vogeley et al. (2003) and Vogeley et al. (2004) for an investiga-
tion of the neural correlates of the first-person perspective.
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The  relationship  between  the  minimal
sense of self and the cortical motor system was
recently revealed. The motor experience of one’s
own body, even at a covert level, allows an im-
plicit and pre-reflective bodily self-knowledge to
emerge, leading to a self/other distinction. In-
deed it  was recently shown that in a task in
which differently rotated static pictures of right
and  left  human  hands  were  presented,  parti-
cipants who had to determine whether each ob-
served hand was the right or the left one pro-
duced faster responses when observing the pic-
tures  of  their  dominant hand with respect  to
others’ hands (Ferri et al. 2011). However, when
participants were asked to explicitly discrimin-
ate between their hands and the hands of oth-
ers, the self-advantage disappeared. Implicit and
explicit  recognition  of  the  bodily  self  dissoci-
ated: only implicit recognition of the bodily self,
mapped  in  motor  terms,  facilitated  implicit
bodily self-processing.
A subsequent fMRI study by  Ferri et al.
(2012),  using  a  similar  hand  mental  rotation
task, demonstrated that a bilateral cortical net-
work formed by the supplementary and pre-sup-
plementary  motor  areas,  the  anterior  insula,
and the occipital  cortex was activated during
processing of participants’ own hands. Further-
more, the contralateral ventral premotor cortex
was uniquely and specifically activated during
mental rotation of the participants’ own domin-
ant hands. The ventral premotor cortex might
represent  one  of  the  essential  anatomo-func-
tional bases for the motor aspect of bodily self-
hood, also in light of its role in integrating self-
related  multisensory  information.  This  hypo-
thesis is corroborated by clinical and functional
evidence  showing  its  systematic  involvement
with body awareness (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Berti
et  al. 2005;  Arzy et  al. 2006).  This  evidence
demonstrates  a  tight  relationship between the
bodily  self-related  multimodal  integration  car-
ried out by the cortical motor areas, specifying
the motor potentialities of one’s body and guid-
ing its motor behaviour, and the implicit aware-
ness one entertains of one’s body as one’s own
body and of one’s behaviour as one’s own beha-
viour.  Because  the  ventral  premotor cortex is
anatomically connected to visual  and somato-
sensory  areas  in  the  posterior  parietal  cortex
and to frontal motor areas we hypothesize that
premotor cortex activity,  by underpinning the
detection of congruent multisensory signals from
one’s own body, could be at the origin of the
experience of owning one’s own body parts. 
This  minimal  notion  of  the  self,  namely
the bodily self as power-for-action (see  Gallese
&  Sinigaglia 2010,  2011a),  tacitly presupposes
ownership of an action-capable agentive entity;
hence it primarily rests upon the functionality
of the motor system. As we just saw, empirical
evidence supports the neural realization of this
implicit aspect of selfhood in the brain’s motor
cortex. Since the minimal bodily self rests neur-
ally  on  the  motor  system,  it  logically  follows
that characteristics of the latter are defining for
the former. This implies that one could attrib-
ute to the minimal bodily self known features of
the motor system, including its capacities and
limitations. The motor aspects of the bodily self
provide the means to integrate self-related mul-
timodal  sensory  information  about  the  body
and the world with which it interacts. This is
also important from a theoretical point of view,
because it opens the possibility of linking the
openness of the self to the world to the motor
potentialities its bodily nature entails.
One  could  then  posit  that  the  minimal
bodily self when conceived in terms of its motor
potentialities has a dual function. On the one
hand,  it  constitutes  important  aspects  of  the
basic sense of self. On the other, it shapes our
perception and pre-reflective conception of oth-
ers as other selves incarnated in a motorly-cap-
able physical body with capacities and experi-
ences similar to ours. Through mirror mechan-
isms and embodied simulation, others appear to
us as second selves, or second persons. We be-
lieve that this perspective provides a more vivid
experience  of  intersubjectivity,  relative  to  the
detached, propositional deliberation on the ex-
periences of others available in standard mind
reading of others.
5 Body and language: Reflexiveness
According to the perspective so far delineated,
body, actions, and feelings play a direct role in
Gallese, V. & Cuccio, V. (2015). The Paradigmatic Body - Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 14(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570269 10 | 22
www.open-mind.net
our knowledge of others. The question remains
open as to whether our propositional represent-
ations are totally separate from this bodily di-
mension. Our hypothesis is that they are not.
But it remains a fact that linguistic and bodily
cognition afford us diversified modalities of epi-
stemic access to the world, even though often
such  modalities  contaminate  one  another  and
are inevitably interwoven.
The mind, from the perspective delineated
here, is therefore an embodied mind, though it
would be more correct to speak of a corporeal
mind. The concept of embodiment can induce
one to think that a mind pre-existing the body
can  subsequently  live  in  it,  and  use  it.  The
truth is that mind and body are two levels of
description of the same reality, which manifests
different  properties  according  to  the  chosen
level of description and the language employed
to describe it. A thought is neither a muscle nor
a neuron. But its contents, the contents of our
mental  representations,  are  inconceivable
without our corporeity. Likewise it is difficult to
imagine  how the  representational  format  of  a
propositional type can have developed without
our corporeality. Language somehow allows us,
as we will see, to transcend our corporeity; nev-
ertheless, we posit that the bond with the body
is always present.
A few years ago,  Gallese (2000) proposed
that  we look  at  the  evolution  of  human lan-
guage as  an exaptation14 of  functional  sensor-
imotor processes, which put them into the ser-
vice of human linguistic competence. The hypo-
thesis of exaptation was then developed in sub-
sequent papers and later elaborated in terms of
“neural  exploitation”  (Gallese &  Lakoff 2005;
Gallese 2008), or “neural reuse” (Gallese 2014).
“Neural  exploitation”  consists  in  the  reuse  of
neural resources, originally evolved to guide our
interactions with the world, to serve the more
recently evolved linguistic competence. This no-
tion of reuse implies a functional uncoupling of
the sensorimotor system from muscular output,
to guide the generative-syntactic aspects of lan-
guage by functionally connecting it to the pre-
14 Exaptation refers to the shift in the course of evolution of a given
trait or mechanism, which is later on reused to serve new purposes
and functions (see Gould & Lewontin 1979). 
frontal  and,  more  generally,  non-sensorimotor
circuits. According to this view, intentionality,
the aboutness of our representations, is—in the
first place—an exapted property of the action
models instantiated by the cortical motor sys-
tem (Gallese 2000, p. 34). The sensorimotor sys-
tem,  when  uncoupled  from  muscular  output,
makes available to us a model, or paradigm, of
our  motor  knowledge.  As  such,  not  only  it
houses  causative  properties  but  also  content
properties.  And this  relation to a content,  or
aboutness, is a primitive expression of intention-
ality, then exploited by other forms of repres-
entations. This perspective on reuse is acquiring
more and more supporters (see  Dehaene 2005;
Anderson 2010 ).15
Compelling evidence shows that humans,
when  processing  language,  activate  the  motor
system both at the phono-articulatory and at
the  semantic  level.  When  listening  to  spoken
words or looking at someone speaking to us, our
motor system simulates the phono-articulatory
gestures employed to produce those very same
words.  Furthermore,  processing  action-related
linguistic  expressions  activates  regions  of  the
motor system congruent in somatotopic fashion
with the processed semantic content. Reading or
listening to a sentence describing a hand action
activates the motor representation of the same
action (for a review, see Gallese 2008; Glenberg
& Gallese 2012). Interestingly, somatotopic mo-
tor activation has also been observed during the
comprehension of abstract and figurative use of
language such as metaphors and idioms (e.g.,
Guan et  al. 2013;  Boulenger 2012;  see  also
Gallese & Lakoff 2005 on the bodily foundation
of concepts). However, it is important to note
that embodied simulation is not always involved
in language comprehension, and that there is no
contradiction in saying this. There are cases in
which language, at least at the content level, is
not tied to any form of  bodily knowledge.  In
such cases (e.g., when we talk about the notions
such as moral judgement or intelligence) no em-
bodied simulation is likely to be at play. 
Nevertheless,  the problems that language
raises for the embodied perspective on human
15 For a discussion of different views on the notion of reuse, see Gallese
(2014).
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social  cognition are still  enormous.  As clearly
underlined, among others, by the Italian philo-
sopher  Paolo Virno (2003,  2011), the common
linguistic  space  shared  by  a  community  of
speakers proves to be incommensurably differ-
ent from the pre-linguistic  one.  The linguistic
dimension is based on a distinction between lin-
guistic utterances and facts about the world, be
they  referable  to  physical  or  psychological
events. We can say that “today the sun is shin-
ing” and be understood, even if outside the win-
dow snow is falling. Or we can maintain that
“all Italians want to pay taxes”, again being un-
derstood  and  simultaneously  contradicted  by
the factual truth of the enormous tax evasion in
our country.
According  to  Virno,  the  gap  between
meaning  and  denotation  (what  he  calls  the
neutrality of meaning, namely the fact that the
meaning of a word such as, for example, “man”,
can be understood apart from any reference to
an instance of man) is referable to linguistic re-
flexiveness, i.e., to the fact that language refers
to itself and that with words we can talk about
other words. It seems to us that the reflexive-
ness of language is a product of the symbolic
nature  of  linguistic  representations.  The  sym-
bolic nature of such representations is what al-
lows language to break away from the “here and
now”; it is what allows the neutrality of mean-
ing.
In order for a sign to be symbolic it neces-
sarily has to be reflexive. What makes a sign a
symbol is its being part of a system in which
each term is correlatively defined in relation to
the other terms within the system and in rela-
tion  to  the  renegotiation  of  this  relationship
constantly taking place within the system itself.
It is the use of a symbol within a given context
that each time redefines relationships inside the
language system.
Thus, symbolic relationships are by defini-
tion characterized by reflexiveness. Symbols are
defined through other symbols. This level of re-
flexiveness is pre-theoretical; it emerges in the
linguistic activity of each speaker and leads to a
form of linguistic awareness of a practical char-
acter.  This  practical  linguistic  awareness  has
been called the epilinguistic quality and thus it
has  been  distinguished  from  the  theoretical
quality that is expressed in the metalanguage of
linguistics (Culioli 1968;  Lo Piparo 2003). The
concept of epilinguistic quality refers to the nat-
ural tendency of speakers to reflect on their own
language—a tendency made possible by the dis-
tinctive quality of language being able to speak
of itself. 
The uniqueness of human language is also
maintained by classical cognitivism and by cog-
nitive linguistics, but for very different reasons.
The otherness of human language in comparison
with other systems of communication known in
the animal world derives from its linguistic re-
cursive quality. In an often-quoted article writ-
ten some years ago (Hauser et al. 2002) defined
the faculty of language in a narrow sense (FLN)
as being expressed by recursivity. Nevertheless,
this  perspective,  in addition to suffering from
the  usual  cognitivist  solipsism,  is  exposed  to
comparative verification in the animal world. If
the FLN marks human linguistic uniqueness in
terms of syntactic recursivity, the latter must be
entirely absent in the extra-human animal king-
dom.
Actually, the facts tell us exactly the op-
posite. Recent studies (Gentner et al. 2006; Abe
& Watanabe 2011; see also  Margoliash & Nus-
baum 2009; Bloomfield et al. 2011) have shown
that  singing  species  of  birds  like  starlings  or
finches demonstrate, both in the production and
in  the  reception  of  conspecifics’  vocalizations,
the ability to produce and to extract recursive
syntactic characteristics. The study by Abe and
Watanabe also shows that the development of
this competence is dependent on social encoun-
ters with the vocalizations of other conspecific
individuals.  Finally,  these authors have shown
that lesion of the lateral magnocellular nucleus
of the anterior nidopallium, a motor structure
comparable to the basal ganglia of primates, in-
volved both in the production and the percep-
tion of song, prevents finches from discriminat-
ing the syntactic-recursive characteristics of the
song they hear. 
These results show that the best strategy
for studying some of the most relevant aspects
of human social cognition, even demonstrating
the bases of their uniqueness, consists in a pre-
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liminary recognition of the mechanisms and fac-
ulties that we share with the rest of the animal
world.  As  maintained  in  the  past  (Gallese
2003b, 2008), the difference between human and
nonhuman nature could originally have been of
a  quantitative  rather  than  a  qualitative
nature.16
6 Body and language: Facts and 
challenges
One of the key challenges for the embodied ap-
proach  to  human  social  cognition  consists  in
trying to understand whether and how our bod-
ily  nature  determines  some  of  our  linguistic
activities, such as denying, asking, or doubting,
that  seem  to  be  exclusively  human.  Are  lin-
guistic activities as those ones anchored to bod-
ily mechanisms? The question is open and em-
pirical research must address this challenge in
the coming years. In the meantime, at least at a
purely speculative level, let us try to delineate a
possible point of contact between the anthropo-
genic power of language and embodied simula-
tion.17 
There is indeed a way to connect the com-
mon  pre-linguistic  sphere  to  the  linguistic  one
(Gallese 2003b,  2007,  2008;  Gallese &  Lakoff
2005; Glenberg & Gallese 2012). This consists in
showing that language, when it refers to the body
in action, brings into play the neural resources
normally used to move that very same body. See-
ing someone performing an action, like grabbing
an object,  and listening  to  or  reading  the lin-
guistic description of that action lead to a similar
motor simulation that activates some of the same
regions  of  our cortical  motor system,  including
those with mirror properties, normally activated
when we actually perform that action.
These data on the role of simulation in un-
derstanding language (see Pulvermüller 2013 for
a review of this topic) broadly confirm a thesis
already discussed in the history of  philosophy
(for  instance,  by Epicurus,  Campanella,  Vico,
16 According to this perspective, linguistic syntax could originate and
be modelled upon syntactic motor competence, the latter being ex-
apted and put at the service of the new linguistic competence (see
Gallese 2007, 2008).
17 With the expression “anthropogenic  power  of language” we mean
that the human nature, as we know it, depends on language.
see  Usener 1887 and  Firpo 1940 or  Condillaco
2001).  The  thesis  in  question  claims  for  the
bodily,  sensory,  and motor  dimensions  a  con-
stitutive role in language production and under-
standing. However, it seems that the relation-
ship between language and body does not move
in a single direction. The fact is that language
is without doubts constitutive of human nature
and, as such, it seems to offer us wholly human
modalities of experiencing our corporeity.
In this sense, neuroscientific data on the
role of simulation during understanding of lan-
guage also lend themselves to a mirror and com-
plementary reading with respect to that previ-
ously proposed. On the one hand it is plausible
that embodied simulation might play a crucial
role in understanding language. Indeed, if one
reversibly  interferes  with  this  process,  for  in-
stance  by  means  of  TMS stimulation,  under-
standing  of  language  is  jeopardized.  On  the
other hand, language allows us—and in this we
are unique among all living species—to fix and
relive specific aspects of our bodily experience.
Through language we can crystallize and relive
fragments of  experiences that  are not  topical,
that is to say are not my experiences now, but
become a paradigm, a model, for understanding
ourselves and others.
In the following section we discuss the role
of embodied simulation seen as a  paradigm or
model in the light of the Aristotelian notion of
paradeigma.18 For the time being it suffices to
stress that the possibility of hypostatizing and
then segments of our experiences independently
of our immediate physical context, or independ-
ently of specific physical stimuli, is a possibility
that only the possession of language allows us
to experience. The faculty of language is there-
fore, on one side, rooted in corporeality but, in
turn,  changes  and  moulds  our  way  of  living
bodily experiences.
7 Body and language: Embodied 
simulation as a paradigm?
The relation between body and language was to
a great extent underestimated in the last cen-
18 For  an  earlier  formulation  of  this  hypothesis,  see  Gallese
(2013).
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tury, thanks, above all, to Chomsky’s major in-
fluence. In 1966 Chomsky published a book sig-
nificantly  entitled  Cartesian  Linguistics.
Descartes is the originator of the idea that lan-
guage  has  little  to  do  with  the  body.19 The
Cartesian  thesis  on  the  relationship  between
language and body implies,  on one side,  that
the body is not a substratum and material of
language and, on the other, that language is ex-
clusively a tool that expresses a thought formed
independently of  language itself.  According to
Descartes (1642) and the Cartesian tradition in
which  Chomsky  stands,  language  is  a  tool
through  which  we  manifest  an  autonomous
thought  that  precedes  language—a  thought
structured  by  logic  but  certainly  not  by  lan-
guage, whose role is circumscribed and downs-
ized to that of being a mere label of thoughts
(cf. Hinzen & Sheehan 2013 for a critical discus-
sion of the issue).
The theses informing the Cartesian idea of
language are challengeable nowadays. Language
makes  meaning  general,  releasing  it  from the
context,  that  is,  from the dimensions of  who,
what,  how,  where,  and  when.  Language,  in
other words, provides us with a unique modality
of  reference  to  the  world,  allowing  us  at  the
same time to transcend contingent determina-
tions and to define them at  a different  level,
thanks to the use of concepts like subject, ob-
ject,  time,  space,  universal,  etc.  It  is  perhaps
not trivial to notice that such concepts corres-
pond  to  precise  grammatical  structures  and
that,  most likely,  the use of  a grammatically-
structured  language  contributed,  by  co-evolu-
tionary dynamics, to the structuring of rational
thought characterized by such features (Hinzen
& Sheehan 2013).
Hence, thanks to language we can speak
of  humankind without referring in  particular
to  any  of  the  single  individuals  sharing  the
property  of  belonging  to  the  human species.
We can speak of a subject aside from the indi-
vidual  embodiments  of  this  attribute,  etc.
Language,  as  stressed by Virno,  furnishes us
with general meanings, that is, meanings valid
19 It is  worth noting that Descartes also defended the related thesis
that animals don’t have soul exactly because they do not have lan-
guage. Cf. Descartes (1637).
for  everybody but,  at  the same time,  mean-
ings that do not necessarily denote a particu-
lar instantiation. 
Interestingly enough, according to Giorgio
Agamben (2008) what holds “for everybody and
nobody”  is  referable  to  the  Greek  notion  of
paradeigma,  originally  explored  by  Aristotle.
The  paradeigma is a typical form of rhetorical
reasoning  that  moves  between  individual  and
individual according to a form of bipolar analo-
gical  knowledge.  Agamben (2008,  pp.  23-24),
radicalizing  Aristotle’s  theses,  maintains  that
the  paradigm  can  only  be  conceived  of  by
abandoning  the  dichotomy between  individual
and universal: the rule does not exist before the
single cases to which it is applied. The rule is
nothing  but  its  own  exhibition  in  the  single
cases themselves, which thus it renders intelli-
gible.
By applying the notion of paradigm to the
grammatical  “rules”  of  language,  Agamben
touches upon a central point: the so-called lin-
guistic rule derives from the suspension of the
concrete denotative application: 
[t]hat is to say, in order to be able to serve
as an example, the syntagm must be sus-
pended from its normal function, and, nev-
ertheless, it is precisely through this non-
operation and this suspension that it can
show how the syntagm works,  can allow
the  formulation  of  the  rule.  (Agamben
2008, p. 26) 
To better explain the notions of rule and sus-
pension of  a  denotative  application,  Agamben
refers to Latin declensions. When we want to
learn the first declension we inflect a noun, for
example “rosa”, “rosae”, etc… In so doing, we
are suspending the usual denotative application
of this noun and, by means of this suspension,
we are showing how the declension works. Ac-
cording to  Agamben, “[…] in the paradigm, in-
telligibility does not precede the phenomenon,
but is, so to speak, ‘alongside’ it (parà)” (2008,
p.  29).  In  other  words  “[…]  in  the  paradigm
there is not an origin or an  arché: every phe-
nomenon is the origin, every image is archaic”
(Agamben 2008, p. 33).
Gallese, V. & Cuccio, V. (2015). The Paradigmatic Body - Embodied Simulation, Intersubjectivity, the Bodily Self, and Language.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 14(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570269 14 | 22
www.open-mind.net
On  Agamben’s  reading,  the  Aristotelian
paradeigma  is a good model for describing the
creation of linguistic rules. Starting from Agam-
ben’s  intuition  and seeking  to  move one  step
further, the hypothesis that we want to explore
here is that the notion of paradeigma is a good
model  not  only  for  the  creation  of  linguistic
rules but also for the definition of the embodied
simulation mechanism. In this connection, simu-
lation allows us, at a sensorimotor level, to hy-
postatize and reuse what holds “for everybody
and nobody”. 
To understand to what extent the analogy
between  embodied  simulation  and  paradeigma
works it  is  necessary to go back to Aristotle.
What is  meant by  paradeigma  in  Aristotelian
thought  and  in  what  context  does  Aristotle
make use of this notion? 
The paradeigma, as already anticipated, is
a  typical  is  a  typical  argument  form used  to
persuade  and  devoted  to  the  discussion  of
“things  that  can  be  otherwise.”  Aristotle  dis-
cusses this argument form, which does not have
any demonstrative aim, both in Prior Analytics
and in  Rhetoric. Argumentation based on the
paradeigma, for  example,  consists  in  the
presentation by the orator of an exemplary case,
based on a historical fact or a figment of the
imagination, as in the case of fables. It is the
juxtaposition of the present situation and an ex-
emplary one that guides, or should guide, the
actions of the person to whom the argumenta-
tion is addressed. Thus the paradeigma, among
rhetorical  argumentations,  is  that  which  goes
from the particular to the particular, from an
exemplary case to the present situation. Argu-
mentation  based  on  the  paradeigma  does  not
make a claim for universality. The orator is not
bound to offer an exhaustive number of cases
justifying  a  universally  valid  conclusion.  One
case is sufficient, provided that it is particularly
suitable, and precisely exemplary, in relation to
the  context  in  which  the  argumentative  dis-
course takes place.
For  these  reasons,  though resembling  in-
ductive  reasoning  (epagoghé),  which  proceeds
from the particular to the universal, and indeed
considered by Aristotle himself as the transposi-
tion  of  inductive  reasoning  to  the  rhetorical
sphere,  the  paradeigma  conquers  its  own
autonomous space.  To confirm this,  one  need
only to think that in  Prior Analytics  Aristotle
(Ross 1978)  devotes  two separate  chapters  to
paradigm and induction: respectively XXIV and
XXI of Book II. 
On  the  one  side  the  paradeigma,  which
proceeds  “from the  part  to  the  part”  (Prior
Analytics 69a, 15), are peculiar aspects distin-
guishing it from the epagoghé; on the other, it is
by all means a form of induction, as Aristotle
expressly affirms at the start of Chapter XX of
Book II of Rhetoric. According to Piazza (2008,
p. 117) there are at least two reasons why the
paradeigma  can  still  be  considered  a  form of
epagoghé, despite the peculiarities that charac-
terize  it.  Both these reasons seem interesting,
not  only  for  the  definition  of  paradigm that,
starting  from Aristotle,  Agamben discusses  in
relation to linguistic praxis, but also and above
all in the framework of a reflection on the mir-
ror  mechanisms  enacted  in  embodied  simula-
tion. 
Following  Piazza’s (2008, p. 117) reading
of Aristotle, the first of the characteristics of in-
ductive reasoning also found in the paradeigma
consists in always proceeding from what is “best
known  and  first  for  us”  (Aristotle,  Analytica
posteriora II.19), or from what is for us most
immediate and most easily accessible,  because
being part  of  our baggage of  experiences and
knowledge. The second characteristic is, instead,
identifying similarities between particular cases.
At  another  level  of  analysis,  both  these
features also characterize embodied simulation.
One condition for the simulation mechanism’s
being enacted is sharing a baggage of (motor)
experiences  and knowledge.  Embodied  simula-
tion  is  enacted  starting  from  what  for  us  is
“first,” i.e., what for us is known and easily ac-
cessible in terms of motor potentialities and ex-
periences. Sharing a repertoire of practices, ex-
periences, and sensations is therefore an essen-
tial condition, since only by starting from what
is well known to us it is possible to identify ana-
logies between our actions and others’. We un-
derstand the other starting from our own bodily
experience, which is what is “best known and
first for us”, again using Aristotle’s words. On
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the basis of this knowledge we identify similar
elements in our experiences as well as in those
of others. 
Embodied simulation, when manifested in
the phenomenon of  action,  emotion,  or sensa-
tion mirroring always involves an original I-thou
relationship  in  which  the  “thou”  is  the  term
with respect to which the self is constituted. On
the other hand, the “self” is the basis on which
immediate  and  implicit  understanding  of  the
“thou” is possible. 
The analogy with the cognitive mechanism
subtended  by  paradigmatic  reasoning  appears
evident.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of  Aristotle’s
paradeigma,  an  example,  a  particular  case,  is
understood because it is close to our feeling, our
experiences, and our baggage of knowledge. And
nevertheless  the  process  does  not  stop  here.
This form of understanding of a particular that
is not me will lead me to new conclusions and
to a deeper understanding of myself, of my par-
ticular case, and of  my  situation. Our experi-
ences are therefore the measure from which we
understand  others  and  their  experiences  (i.e.,
our previous actions,  emotions, and so forth).
And others’ experiences (i.e., their actions, emo-
tions and so forth) are for us a condition for
deeper  understanding  of  ourselves.  Thus,  the
embodied  simulation underpinning my present
experience is  also  a  paradeigma  from which I
can understand what I  observe in  others  and
draw inferences from it for others and for my-
self.
The embodied simulation mechanism, thus
defined,  is  constitutive  of  the  process  of  con-
struction  of  meaning.  In  this  connection,  em-
bodied simulation enacted while understanding
language is not my present experience but the
paradeigma in relation to which some of our lin-
guistic  expressions  acquire  a  meaning  that  is
rooted in the body. When we read or listen to
the description of an action, the process of sim-
ulation that takes place in us is not the enact-
ment of the same action; we would be echop-
ractic if we were unable to avoid imitating and
reproducing all the actions that we see or whose
description we listen to or read. According to
our  hypothesis,  embodied  simulation  rather
makes  available  to  us  an  exemplary  case,  a
model,  in  relation  to  which  understanding  of
language is also realized. If therefore it is true
that  the  symbolic  dimension  opens  up  some
possibilities  for  us  and  creates  worlds  for  us
that only linguistic creatures can enter, it is also
true that language strongly exploits mechanisms
rooted  in  our  corporeality.  Enactment  of  the
simulation  process  in  understanding  language
seems to suggest that the symbolic dimension
and the bodily dimension cohabit in linguistic
praxis.
Nevertheless,  the  nature of  this  relation-
ship is still not entirely clear, nor is the confine
between the bodily dimension and the typically
or exclusively symbolic dimension. Can it be hy-
pothesized that corporeal knowledge also plays
a role in understanding logical operators such
as, for instance, negation or disjunction, or that
it plays a role in understanding the interrogat-
ive form? The whole symbolic nature of these
linguistic  structures  appears  in  some  respects
beyond  question.  Research  on  these  issues  is
now open (Kaup et al. 2006,  2007;  Tettamanti
et al. 2005;  Christensen 2009;  Tomasino et al.
2010; Liuzza et al. 2011; Kumar et al. 2013) and
today  many  wonder  about  the  possibility  of
identifying  mechanisms  that  can  anchor  such
structures  to  our  bodily  experience.  We  take
this to be the real challenge for the embodied
cognition approach to the role  played by lan-
guage in human social cognition.
Let  us  once  more  return  to  the  Aris-
totelian  notion  of  paradeigma  and  appraise
other possible hints for substantiating the ana-
logy with the embodied simulation mechanism.
The  understanding  that  the  rhetor  calls  for
through  reasoning  based  on  the  paradeigma
should lead the citizen to choose what is best
for him in various circumstances.  The goal of
such reasoning is to determine understanding of
a present situation, by analogy with a historical
example or a fable,  and, on the basis  of  this
more informed knowledge, to guide the human
being’s  choices.  In other  words,  the rhetorical
example  or  paradeigma is  knowledge  whose
main goal is practical and not theoretical.
A practical aim also characterizes embod-
ied simulation. Embodied simulation is always
aimed at “navigating” in the world and, there-
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fore, eventually at acting. It was hypothesized
that embodied simulation allows us a direct, ex-
periential way of understanding other people’s
actions and experiences and, on the basis of this
understanding, it allows us to regulate our ac-
tions and our experiences. These goals are al-
ways practical. In some respects, the process of
embodied  simulation  that  is  enacted,  for  in-
stance, when reading a novel (see Wojciehowski
& Gallese 2011), also has a practical aim. Liter-
ature recreates a world of emotions and experi-
ences: the emotions and the experiences of the
literary characters inhabit the fictional world of
the novel. The simulation mechanism helps us
to “navigate” that world, even if it is a fictitious
world; it allows us to understand and, in part,
to relive the emotions of the protagonists and
their vicissitudes. The aim in this case is prac-
tical insofar as the simulation mechanism allows
us  to  approach  the  fictitious  other  with  a
second-person  epistemic  perspective  (Gallese
2014).20
Embodied  simulation  makes  implicit
knowledge about others immediately available,
with the aim of regulating our interactions with
them. Our understanding of the literary other is
almost always second-person, based on the pos-
sibility of perceiving analogies between our own
experiences  and  others’  and  made  possible
through  a  hypostatization  of  our  experiences
that is achieved through the simulation mechan-
ism (Wojciehowski & Gallese 2011). 
In the end, what is embodied simulation if
not a suspension of the application of a process?
Let us think of when mirror neurons are activated
in observing actions performed by others; or of
when canonical  neurons are activated while  we
are looking at the keyboard of a computer think-
ing about what we want to write; or when cor-
tical motor neurons are activated when we ima-
gine ourselves writing on that keyboard. These re-
sponses on the part of motor neurons manifest
the activation of implicit knowledge, that is, bod-
ily motor knowledge expressing the motor poten-
tialities of the bodily self mapped by the motor
system in terms of their motor outcomes.
20 A second-person perspective is adopted in social contexts when, im-
plicitly or explicitly, we re-use our own experiences to understand
others. On the notion of second-person perspective see Pauen (2012).
Reuse of motor knowledge, in the absence of
the movement that realizes it, as exemplified by
embodied simulation, is an example of “paradig-
matic knowledge.” Thus, embodied simulation is a
case of implicit paradigmatic knowledge. Accord-
ing to our hypothesis, embodied simulation allows
us to naturalize the notion of paradigm, anchor-
ing it at a level of sub-personal description, whose
neural correlates we can study. 
Our  openness  to the world is  constituted
and made possible by a motor system predispos-
ing and allowing us to adapt our daily and con-
tingent  pragmatic  relationships  with  the  world
against the background of a prefigured but highly
flexible plan of motor intentionality. Such a plan,
intended as the sum of our motor potentialities,
provides its coordination to any single contingent
modality of relation with the world, that is, to
any single action we perform, in which it contin-
ues to actualize itself. This aspect seems import-
ant to us because it shows how specific aspects of
human social  cognition  are  made  possible  and
scaffolded upon processes not necessarily specific
to humans, like embodied simulation.
8 Body and soul
It is improper, or at least it seems so to us, to say
that the soul, the spirit, or intelligence are em-
bodied. If it were so, we would thus return to a
dualistic conception of human nature. Such dual-
ism is always present in the tradition of Western
thought,  though  it  is  often  disguised  in  forms
that, rightly or wrongly, are deemed politically
more correct. Today nearly all cognitive scientists
declare themselves to be monists and physicalists.
Nevertheless, the conception still dominant today
about the cognitive structure of humans and their
functions draws a clear-cut and apparently un-
solvable division between linguistic-cognitive pro-
cesses  and  sensory-motor  processes.  It  matters
little  that  everybody  admits  that  both  are  in
some way referable to the biological physicality of
the brain. The brain, according to classical cog-
nitivism, is divorced from the body and conceived
of as a box of algorithmic wonders.
Classical cognitivism sees the body as an
appendix of little or no interest for decoding the
supposed  algorithms  reportedly  presiding  over
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our cognitive life. Such is a cognitive life with
very  little  vitality,  totally  divorced  not  only
from effectual reality, as we try to show here,
but also from our daily phenomenal experience.
It is  not by chance that the language usually
used to describe cognitive processes is borrowed
from artificial intelligence: algorithms, informa-
tion processing, etc.
Humans,  however,  cannot  be  assimilated
to information-processing entities. Even less ac-
ceptable is the thesis that the concept of mean-
ing is wholly assimilable to the concept of in-
formation. Classical cognitivism has maintained
for decades that intelligence depends on the al-
gorithms that  substantiate  it  and not  on  the
material  substrata  on  which  the  algorithms
themselves  are  believed  to  be  implemented.
This  is  the  so-called  principle  of  the multiple
realizability  of  cognitive  processes.  Embodied
Simulation and its relation to language and cog-
nition casts severe doubts on this principle and
adds  arguments  in  support  of  the  thesis  that
human cognition is tightly and necessarily de-
pendent on the kind of body we have. As such,
the mechanism of Embodied Simulation and the
role it plays in human cognition provide further
arguments in support of the idea that the prin-
ciple  of  multiple  realizability  is  false.  We are
who we are because we evolved by adapting to a
physical  world that obeys a series of  physical
laws, such as that of gravity.
As the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin wrote
in his 1886 Prolegomena zu einer Psychologie der
Architektur,  if  we  were  exclusively  optical
creatures,  aesthetic  judgment  of  the  physical
world  would  be  precluded  to  us.  Are  the
amazement and sense of elevation transmitted to
us by the contemplation of  a Gothic cathedral
conceivable in purely algorithmic terms? Is it con-
ceivable to divorce aesthetic experience from our
daily muscular, tactile, and viscero-motor experi-
ence of reality? Wölfflin (and together with him
many others, among them Merleau-Ponty) main-
tained it was not, and we think that he was right.
We believe that our “natural” propensity to
dualism is, on the one side, the product of our be-
ing asymmetrically positioned between mind and
body,  as  Helmuth Plessner (2006)  maintained.
We are corporeal beings, but at the same time we
maintain that we have a body. On the other side,
the account of the historical result of  the pro-
gressive  de-centralization  of  the  anthropological
dimension  leads  us  to  be  dualist.  We  are  no
longer the living image of God, we are no longer
at the centre of the universe, and perhaps in post-
modern times we are no longer even subjects or
selves. What are we left with but with the claim
of  the total  otherness  and discontinuity of  our
cognitive social life and its underlying processes?
Their  immaterial  nature,  or  more exactly their
total otherness in relation to a corporeity whose
animal origin or essence is—evolutionarily speak-
ing—pretty much clear, is perhaps the only way
of  reaffirming  our  uniqueness.  The  dualism
between mind and body become, thus, a mechan-
ism of defence. The so-called mental Rubicon that
separates us from other non-human living beings
is a very powerful anti-depressive argument for a
disorientated humanity.
At this point, however, a clarification is re-
quired  in  order  to  avoid  unpleasant  misunder-
standings. It is beyond doubt that the least intel-
ligent among humans is incommensurably differ-
ent and  other in relation to the most intelligent
among  chimpanzees,  despite  their  almost  com-
plete sharing of a genetic endowment. The point
is that this quantum leap can be explained, per-
haps, by remaining within an evolutionary frame-
work that does not look for discontinuities foun-
ded on theories of “cognitive catastrophes,” ge-
netic big bangs (as in the case of the so-called
“grammar gene” invoked by Pinker), and so forth.
The  mysterious  uniqueness—and  loneliness—of
humankind in the universe proves more compre-
hensible, or at least more easily approachable, if
empirically investigated after having set aside the
anti-continuist and self-consoling recipes of classic
cognitive science. In our continuist approach, hu-
mankind is not special, because his evolution fol-
lows the same laws that regulate evolution of all
other animals and is in continuity with evolution-
ary paths of other animals. However, our peculiar
evolutionary path leaded us to acquire  species-
specific  characteristics  that  only  human beings
share.
Sigmund Freud realized long before others
how much the self is a bodily self (1923). Freud
also helped us to understand how little we know
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about who we are, particularly when aspiring to
ground this knowledge solely on self-questioning
rationality. What are the drives of which Freud
spoke but a further manifestation of the double
status of  our flesh? We are  Körper (objectual
and represented body) and Leib (lived body), as
Edmund  Husserl  maintained.  Today  cognitive
neuroscience can shed new light on the Leib by
investigating the Körper. The point is not to re-
duce the Leib to the Körper, but to understand
that the empirical investigation of  the  Körper
can tell us new things about the Leib.
9 Provisional conclusions
In this paper we addressed and discussed the
notions of intersubjectivity and of the self as in-
dissolubly  intertwined outcomes  of  the  bodily
and symbolic dimensions. We proposed that em-
bodied simulation seems to be able to naturalize
the notion of paradigm, thus naturalizing one of
the processes that makes language reflexiveness
possible,  and  thus  contributing  to  “creating”
the  human  being.  Being  a  subject  perhaps
means being a body that learns to express itself
and to express its world thanks to the paradigm
—embodied simulation—that allows one to go
beyond the body while remaining anchored to
it. A new understanding of intersubjectivity can
benefit from a bottom-up study and character-
ization of the non-declarative and non-metarep-
resentational  aspects  of  social  cognition  (see
Gallese 2003a, 2007).
One key issue of the new approach to in-
tersubjectivity we proposed here is the investig-
ation of the neural bases of our capacity to be
attuned to the intentional  relations of  others.
At a basic level, our interpersonal interactions
do not make explicit use of propositional atti-
tudes. This basic level consists of embodied sim-
ulation processes that enable the constitution of
a  shared  meaningful  interpersonal  space.  The
shared  intersubjective  space  in  which  we  live
from birth constitutes a substantial part of our
semantic  space.  Self  and other  relate  to  each
other  because  are  opposite  extensions  of  the
same correlative and reversible we-centric space
(Gallese 2003a). Observer and observed are part
of  a  dynamic  system  governed  by  reversible
rules. By means of intentional attunement, “the
other” is much more than a different representa-
tional system; it becomes a bodily self, like us.
This new epistemological approach to inter-
subjectivity has the merit of generating predic-
tions about the intrinsic functional nature of our
social  cognitive  operations,  cutting  across,  and
not being subordinated to a specific ontology of
mind, like that purported by the classic cognitiv-
ist approach. Open questions that need to be fur-
ther investigated in the future concern the biolo-
gical mechanisms underlying our species-specific
forms  of  self-knowledge  and  intersubjectivity.
Language will have a special role in this investiga-
tion. To what extent and how are symbolic opera-
tions  constrained  by  biological  mechanisms?  Is
this connection between symbolic representations
and bodily mechanisms that has been responsible
for our specificity? These and other questions will
be object of investigation in the next years
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